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AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF THE 
CONFLICT IN SYRIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following numerous humanitarian brutalities committed throughout the 
1990s around the world, the United Nations sought to create a protocol 
that would allow the international community to prevent further mass 
atrocity crimes. After many debates and compromises, the Responsibility 
to Protect program was created. Consisting of three ideological “pillars,” 
the protocol allows other nations to interfere if a country is committing 
one of four mass atrocity crimes against its own populace. Such 
interference can range from an official reprimand to military intervention. 
This program has already been employed in Libya and the Côte d’Ivoire; 
however, its lack of use in the ongoing Syrian conflict speaks to a level of 
deficiency in the program itself. While members of the international 
community have had varying criticisms of the program, the Responsibility 
to Protect program suffers most from the political realities and strategic 
alliances that permeate the United Nations Security Council. Although 
several reforms of the Responsibility to Protect have been suggested, 
ranging from adopting national programs to political compromise, no 
reform seems imminent. It appears that this groundbreaking program is 
here to stay—for better or for worse. 
II. BACKGROUND AND COMPOSITION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT (“R2P”) 
A. Buildup to the R2P 
In 2000, Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
gave his Millennium Report to the General Assembly. Spurred by a 
decade of humanitarian atrocities that include abuses in Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Somalia, and the Rwandan Genocide,1 a substantial part of Annan’s report 
addressed the issue of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping 
operations.2 Recognizing the seemingly insurmountable divide between 
 
 
 1. For an analysis of the Rwandan Genocide, see ALISON LIEBHAFSKY DES FORGES, LEAVE 
NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999). 
 2. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First 
Century: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 215–19, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000). 
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state sovereignty and human rights, Annan proclaimed, “no legal 
principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield crimes against 
humanity.”3 
Apparently moved by Annan’s speech, the Canadian government 
created the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (“ICISS”) in 2001.4 Tasked with the job of tackling the 
problem of humanitarian intervention, the committee wrote a report titled 
The Responsibility to Protect (“ICISS Report”).5 The committee decided 
to eliminate the notion of humanitarian intervention,6 and instead adopt a 
“responsibility to protect” one’s own nation.7 Failure to protect one’s own 
nation would then shift the responsibility to the international community.8 
Furthermore, six criteria must be met before there can be international 
intervention: (1) military intervention must be motivated by the right 
intention—to prevent or stop human suffering;9 (2) military intervention 
must be the last resort; (3) military intervention must be proportional to 
prevent or stop human suffering; (4) a reasonable chance to end suffering 
must exist; (5) an extraordinary level of human suffering must exist for the 
threatened harm to be considered sufficiently clear and serious; and 
(6) United Nations Security Council authorization should be sought prior 
to military intervention.10 
The ICISS Report was considered during the 2005 World Summit, 
when world leaders met to discuss, among other things, the concept of a 
 
 
 3. Id. ¶ 219. 
 4. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT VII (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS 
Report]. See generally ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT (2011). 
 5. See ICISS Report, supra note 4. 
 6. Steven Haines, Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and the Use 
of Force, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MODERN WARFARE 307, 322–23 (George 
Kassimeris ed., 2010). 
 7. Id. at 323. 
 8. Jonah Eaton, Note, An Emerging Norm? Determining the Meaning and Legal Status of the 
Responsibility to Protect, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 765, 774 (2011). Jonah Eaton notes that this 
responsibility shift mirrors that of the “surrogate protection” theory of international refugee law. Id. at 
774 n.52. This theory states that the international community can directly intervene in the affairs of a 
given state if a group of people have sought protection, suffered persecution, and have fled as a result 
of said persecution. Id. at 774. The ICISS Report noted that military intervention should only occur 
during large-scale loss of life, genocide, ethnic cleansing, or serious violations of humanitarian law. 
See id. at 775–76. 
 9. This “right intention” language will be critiqued infra Part IV. 
 10. ICISS Report, supra note 4, ¶¶ 4.18–4.19, 4.23, 4.32–4.43. 
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responsibility to protect.11 After deliberation and compromise, paragraphs 
138 and 139 were written into the World Summit Outcome document 
(“Summit Outcome”).12  
Most importantly, paragraph 139 stated “the international community, 
through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the [United Nations] Charter, to help protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity”13 (“Mass Atrocity Crimes”)14 Two points are important 
to recognize. First, the Summit Outcome only recognizes peaceful means 
of enforcing this responsibility.15 Second, regardless of the interpretation 
of unilateral action or military intervention, the Summit Outcome 
eliminated any notion of absolute state sovereignty.16  
However, this Summit Outcome was not instantly adopted. After being 
drafted, it was subject to debate, and, while generally lauded by numerous 
countries, came under intense criticism from others. These criticisms, as 
 
 
 11. Nations had differing expectations for when another sovereign could intervene. See Carlo 
Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many 
Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 191, 201–05 (2008).  
 12. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005) 
[hereinafter Summit Outcome]. This document is a General Assembly Resolution detailing the 
conclusions of the 2005 World Summit. Paragraph 138 stated, “[e]ach individual State has the 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. . . . The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to 
exercise this responsibility. . . . ” Id. ¶ 138. 
 13. Id. ¶ 139 (emphasis added). 
 14. For the purposes of this Note, “ethnic cleansing” will take the place of the term “crime of 
aggression.”  
 15. Mehrdad Payandeh has noted that the Summit Outcome does not recognize any specific 
responsibilities of the Security Council, does not mention the possibility of unilateral or collective 
action on behalf of the General Assembly, and has dropped any criteria needed for an authorization of 
the use of force. Mehrdad Payandeh, Note, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The 
Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 469, 476 (2010); but see Alica L. Bannon, Comment, The Responsibility to Protect: The U.N. 
World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism, 115 YALE L.J. 1157, 1162–63 (2005) (arguing that 
there are instances where unilateral action is justified, such as when the Security Council is 
deadlocked); see also Carsten Stahn, Comment, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 109 (2007) (interpreting the absence of text 
precluding unilateral action as evidence that unilateral action can be utilized). 
 16. Such beliefs had previously been broken, or at least severely weakened, through the United 
Nations’ mandates and constitutive documents for tribunals, such as the Rome Statute establishing the 
International Criminal Court. It should be noted, however, that countries who have opposed the Rome 
Statute have supported the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”), including the United States and Russia. 
See The States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, INT’L CRIM. COURT (last updated Feb. 15, 
2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to% 
20the%20rome%20statute.aspx; see also Luke Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect Beyond 
Borders, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 3, 12–13 (Mar. 2012). 
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well as responses such as those made in Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 report 
“Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”17 will be addressed in Part 
IV.18  
B. Adoption of the R2P 
During the Sixty-third Session of the General Assembly in 2009, the 
General Assembly debated the merits of the Secretary-General’s Report.19 
Many nations supported a responsibility to protect principle,20 and these 
states discussed implementation of such a responsibility. Eventually, the 
General Assembly adopted a resolution that reaffirmed the principles of 
the U.N. Charter,21 highlighting the importance of the prevention of 
serious crimes and the responsibility of the international community to 
hold states accountable for committing such offenses.22 Finally, the 
Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) initiative was adopted as a United 
Nations resolution.23 
 
 
 17. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/63/677, (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Secretary-General’s Report]. 
 18. Importantly, the Secretary General called for restraint in the use of a Security Council veto. 
Id. ¶ 61. 
 19. Outcome of July GA Debate: Adoption of First UN Resolution on RtoP, INT’L COALITION 
FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Sept. 14, 2009), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/ 
component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/2550-adoption-of-first-un-resolution-on-rtop. 
 20. Of particular note, the African Union (AU) spearheaded support for a responsibility to 
protect program, likely the result of the numerous aforementioned atrocities that had occurred there. 
Among other declarations, the AU welcomed a responsibility to protect as a way to prevent mass 
atrocities. See AU Executive Council, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the 
United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus,” AU Doc. Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) (Mar. 7–8, 2005), available 
at http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Calendar_of_%20Events/7th%20extra%20ordinary%20 
session%20ECL/Ext%20EXCL2%20VII%20Report.doc. 
 21. For our purposes, the reaffirmation of Chapters VI and VIII of the U.N. Charter is of 
particular relevance. These Chapters give the Security Council the power to take action that it deems 
appropriate and determines that the Security Council must allow any proposed enforcement action. See 
U.N. Charter chs. VI, VIII.  
 22. G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009). See also GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE 2009 GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY DEBATE: AN ASSESSMENT 1 (2009), available at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/ 
gcr2p_-general-assembly-debate-assessment.pdf; INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT, REPORT ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY DEBATE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 1 (2009), available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICRtoP%20Report-General_ 
Assembly_Debate_on_the_Responsibility_to_Protect%20FINAL%209_22_09.pdf. 
 23. G.A. Res. 63/308, supra note 22. It must be acknowledged that the adoption of this resolution 
does not make the R2P law, but its status is rather that of a norm, one that can be observed and 
honored, but that does not have any binding effect on the international community. Instead, this norm 
is incorporated into other tools that exist to deal with atrocities. See Aidan Hehir, The Responsibility to 
Protect and International Law Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating 
Theory, Practice, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: INTERROGATING 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Philip Cunliffe ed., 2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/10
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The newly-minted R2P consisted of three ideological pillars.24 The 
purpose of the first pillar is to manage the legitimacy of statehood itself, 
and to ensure that the state protects its populace from Mass Atrocity 
Crimes.25 To assist a state in this function, neighboring states adhere to the 
second pillar.  
The second pillar of the R2P is meant to create “mutual commitment 
and an active partnership between the international community and the 
State.”26 This pillar essentially acts as oversight to ensure that the state is 
protecting its people from Mass Atrocity Crimes. The language further 
states that such assistance can be either confidential or public, and can 
come in the form of training, education, assistance, mediation, and/or 
dialogue.27 
The crux of the third pillar deals with international intervention, should 
the home sovereign state fail to act during humanitarian crises.28 The 
 
 
 24. Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 17, ¶ 11 (delineating R2P into a “three-pillar 
strategy”). The first pillar is meant to capture the underlying principle of the R2P: 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.  
Id. ¶ 13 (quoting Summit Outcome, supra note 12, ¶ 138). 
 25. See id. ¶ 11. As the text says, it is a state’s job to protect its populations. Should the sovereign 
state protect its populations, there would be no need for international intervention. 
 26. Id. ¶ 28. To achieve this end, the R2P suggests one of four forms: 
(a) encouraging States to meet their responsibilities under pillar one (para. 138);  
(b) helping them to exercise this responsibility (para. 138);  
(c) helping them to build their capacity to protect (para. 139); and  
(d) assisting States ‘under stress before crises and conflicts break out’(para. 139).  
Id. 
 27. Id. ¶¶ 28–29, 44-45. Should either of these two pillars be enacted, the home nation retains 
control. See INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, CLARIFYING THE THIRD PILLAR 
OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: TIMELY AND DECISIVE RESPONSE (2011), available at http:// 
responsibilitytoprotect.org/Clarifying%20the%20Third%20Pillar.pdf; see also Secretary-General’s 
Report, supra note 17. However, if the sovereign state decides to disregard these two pillars, then the 
U.N.-proposed third pillar will be imposed, the most contentious pillar, the one that is enshrouded by 
debate, as well as the topic of this Note. 
 28. Pillar three states the following: “[T]he international community, through the United Nations, 
also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in 
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the [UN] Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. . . .” Summit Outcome, supra note 12, 
¶ 139. 
The second sentence of paragraph 139 underscores that a wider range of collective actions, 
either peaceful or non-peaceful, could be invoked by the international community if two 
conditions are met: (a) “should peaceful means be inadequate,” and (b) “national authorities 
are manifestly failing to protect their populations” from the four specified crimes and 
violations. In those two cases, paragraph 139 affirms that “we are prepared to take collective 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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language in pillar three refers this power to the Security Council.29 In 
theory, any Security Council member with veto power (the “P5”) could 
stop the combined efforts of the other fourteen Security Council members 
to act under this pillar. The ICISS Report suggested that the P5 create a 
“code of conduct” that determines when they should use their veto 
power.30 However, the P5 could not agree on any suggested language for 
this “code of conduct,” and as a result, no such guideline exists.31  
C. Effects of the R2P 
In order to fully comprehend the reach of the third pillar (or lack 
thereof), certain realities need to be addressed. The first practicality is that 
any intervention must occur only as a result of a Mass Atrocity Crime.32 
The very definitions of these Crimes, however, can cause considerable 
confusion. The vagueness of the term “genocide,” for instance, can stymie 
a nation wanting to intervene but unsure whether genocide is actually 
being committed.33 Crimes against humanity, meanwhile, has a very strict 
definition.34 Because of this narrow phrasing, horrific offenses often do 
 
 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council . . . on a case-by case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate.” 
Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 17, ¶ 49 (emphasis added). 
 29. “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on 
the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf.” U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. In order to take action, the Security Council must receive an 
affirmative vote from nine of its fifteen members, and the action cannot be vetoed by any of the five 
permanent members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (“P5”). See 
THOMAS G. WEISS, MILITARY-CIVILIAN INTERACTIONS: HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2005). 
 30. ICISS Report, supra note 4, ¶¶ 6.20–6.21. 
 31. Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 539–40 
(2009). As this Note will illustrate, this creates enormous difficulties in taking action under the current 
structure of the R2P. 
 32. This limitation is quickly apparent when one realizes that the four Mass Atrocity Crimes 
have both vague and strict definitions, and can often be difficult to show. One example is genocide. In 
order for genocide to exist, there must be “deliberate and systematic destruction, in whole or in part, of 
an ethnic, racial, religious or national group.” T. MARCUS FUNK, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY 
AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 46–50 (2010). 
 33. Ignoring the obvious abstraction that constitutes the phrase “in part,” this definition of 
genocide limits how general violence against a group of people can be categorized. See id. Should a 
sovereign state violently quash demonstrations, an argument would be made that although the action 
was deliberate, it was spontaneous and therefore not systematic, thereby eliminating any qualification 
for the crime of genocide. 
 34. “Crimes against humanity cover those specifically listed prohibited acts when committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.” See generally 
Tamfuh Y.N. Wilson, The International Criminal Court: Creation, Competence, and Impact in Africa, 
3 AFR. J. CRIMINOLOGY & JUST. 85, 95 (2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/10
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not fall under the strict definition.35 These examples are meant to show the 
utter confusion many nations face when deciding if they can act under the 
R2P.36 
Another necessary observation regarding the R2P is the specification 
that military intervention be used only as a last resort.37 Numerous nations 
utilize this practice, and the U.N. has issued condemnations for such 
sovereign practices in the past.38 These sanctions are generally not deemed 
to violate a nation’s sovereignty under the R2P.39 Due to fear of U.N. 
denunciation, however, some nations worry that military intervention will 
come too late if they must wait until all other options have been 
expended.40 Finally, it must be noted that the political and economic 
interests of the P5 often align against one another.41  
 
 
 35. Should a soldier be killed during an aforementioned protest, the crime would not constitute a 
crime against humanity. Although crimes against humanity can apply to military personnel as well as 
to civilians, this attack would most likely not be systematic. See YAVUZ AYDIN, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE 
FOCUS MOST PARTICULARLY ON THE CRIME OF PERSECUTION  8, available at http://www.justice.gov 
.tr/e-journal/pdf/Genocide_Crimes.pdf.  
 36. For more information on the limitations of these categories, see generally U.N. GAOR, 63d 
Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 7, 8, 17, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98 (July 24, 2009) (referencing Singapore and 
South Africa); U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 23–24, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 
2009) (referencing Costa Rica). 
 37. Although the R2P did not adopt the six criteria set forth in Canada’s ICISS report, the R2P 
did specify that all other possibilities should be attempted before military intervention. TAYLOR B. 
SEYBOLT, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
2–4 (2007). This notion has created two results. First, the notion of political, economic, and judicial 
sanctions is relatively uncontroversial when compared to military intervention. Second, military 
intervention can only be justified “in humanitarian terms if the intervention does more good than 
harm.” Id.; see also ICISS Report, supra note 4, ¶ 4.2. 
 38. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 794–96 (6th ed. 2008). 
 39. See Stahn, supra note 15, at 109. 
 40. Nations worry that the Security Council would be forced to “‘patiently wend its way through 
diplomatic measures and economic sanctions’ before it could use military measures to end genocide.” 
Payandeh, supra note 15, at 497 (quoting W. Michael Reisman, Report, Tenth Commission: Present 
Problems of the Use of Armed Force in International Law, Sub-group on Humanitarian Intervention, 
72 ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 237, 244 (2007)). For these nations, the threat 
to national sovereignty is trivialized when compared to atrocities committed in that nation. This worry 
is often exacerbated when a P5 member decides to impede any intervention, let alone a military option. 
This topic will be discussed in depth infra Part IV. 
 41. For example, when voting on a resolution, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France (G3) often vote to intervene in a nation’s action, but often find themselves vetoed by Russia 
and/or China (G2). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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III. PRIOR USES OF THE R2P AND A CASE STUDY INVOLVING SYRIA 
A. Prior Uses of the R2P 
1. Côte d’Ivoire 
There had been a longstanding conflict in the Côte d’Ivoire42 when the 
U.N. created an international peacekeeping force (“UNOCI”) to oversee 
an effort to end the armed conflict.43 The force proved unsuccessful, and 
an increase in violence occurred immediately following the 2010 
presidential election.44 Upon being briefed by the UNOCI, the U.N. 
adopted a resolution formally declaring that Ouattara (the challenger) had 
won, and urged both parties to accept that result. It was not accepted.45 
Then, in March 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted Security 
Council Resolution 1975 (“Resolution 1975”), which recognized Ouattara 
as president, condemned Gbagbo (the incumbent) for his refusal to accept 
or negotiate a settlement, and authorized the UNOCI to protect civilians 
from “the use of heavy weapons” by “all necessary means.”46 Gbagbo’s 
forces were defeated by the UNOCI and the French, and Gbagbo was 
ultimately arrested.47   
 
 
 42. For a more comprehensive history of the Côte d’Ivoire conflict, see Alex J. Bellamy & Paul 
D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, 
87 INT’L AFF. 825 (2011). 
 43. The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was tasked with protecting 
“civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” and was authorized to use “all necessary means 
to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment.” S.C. Res. 1528, ¶¶ 1, 6(i), 
8, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004). 
 44. Among declarations of vote-rigging and canceled votes, violent clashes proceeded in earnest 
between armed supporters of incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo and challenger Alassane Ouattara. 
The Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast (last visited Sept. 19, 
2013). 
 45. John F. Murphy, R2P Comes of Age?: Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Comes of Age? A 
Sceptic’s View, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP L. 413, 435 (2011–12). During the civil war that followed, 
approximately 1,000 people were killed in the town of Duékouē alone, according to a U.N. 
spokesman. Press Release, U.S. Embassy to Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, American Embassy’s National 
Daily Press Review (May 27, 2011) (available at http://abidjan.usembassy.gov/dprpg05272011.html). 
 46. S.C. Res. 1975, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar. 30, 2011). 
 47. Ange Aboa & Loucoumane Coulibaly, Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo Held After French Troops 
Move In, REUTERS, Apr. 11, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/11/ozatp-
ivorycoast-idAFJOE73A01F20110411. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/10
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Interestingly, although Resolution 1975 was unanimously adopted by 
the Security Council, nations had very different reactions to its scope and 
meaning.48 Professor John Murphy notes: 
[The] use of force by U.N. peacekeepers and French troops blurred 
the lines between human protection and regime change and raised 
questions about the role of the U.N. in overriding Cote d’Ivoire’s 
Constitutional Council, about the proper interpretation of 
Resolution 1975, and about the place of neutrality and impartiality 
in U.N. peacekeeping.49 
2. Libya 
Following successful movements that overturned the rulers of Tunisia 
and Egypt, a rebellion commenced against Muammar Gaddafi in February 
2011.50 Around this time, the Security Council cited the R2P doctrine by 
calling on the Libyan Government to meet its responsibility to protect its 
population.51 Libya did not respond. The Human Rights Council then 
convened a special session and adopted Human Rights Council Resolution 
S-15/1, calling for the Libyan government to “meet its responsibility to 
protect its population [and] to immediately put an end to all human rights 
violations,” while concurrently recommending that the General Assembly 
consider the expulsion of Libya from the Security Council.52 Nonetheless, 
despite condemnation from the Arab League and the African Union, the 
 
 
 48. Murphy noted that while the United Kingdom read Resolution 1975 to give “robust power” 
to the UNOCI, China viewed it radically different: 
China always believes that United Nations peacekeeping operations should strictly abide by 
the principle of neutrality. We hope that the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire will 
fulfill its mandate in a strict and comprehensive manner, help to peacefully settle the crisis in 
Cote d’Ivoire and avoid becoming a party to the conflict.  
Murphy, supra note 45, at 436 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6508th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.6508 (Mar. 30, 2011)). 
 49. Id. (quoting Bellamy & Williams, supra note 42, at 835). Although different nations 
interpreted Resolution 1975 in different manners, this intervention utilizing the R2P did not create as 
much direct interference as the earlier response in Libya. 
 50. Calling the rebels “cockroaches,” Gaddafi threatened to “cleanse” Libya house to house, 
acknowledging that the deaths of thousands of rebels and protesters was possible. Adrian Blomfield, 
Libya: More Than 1,000 Dead, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London) (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.telegraph 
.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8342543/Libya-more-than-1000-dead.html. 
 51. The Security Council declared that the Libyan Government needed to “act with restraint, [in 
order] to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. . . .” Press Release, Security 
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Libya, U.N. Press Release SC/10180 (Feb. 22, 2011). 
 52. H.R.C. Res. S-15/1, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 15th Sess., Feb. 25, 2011, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/S-15/1, ¶¶ 2, 4 (Feb. 25, 2011). 
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violence in Libya escalated rather than subsided.53 Following regional 
criticisms, which had no observable effect on the fighting, the Security 
Council met March 17, 2011, to implement what would be the first use of 
the R2P.54  
The Security Council first called for “all necessary measures” to be 
taken in order to protect civilians and civilian-occupied areas that were 
threatened by attack in Security Council Resolution 1973.55 Two days 
after Resolution 1973 was passed, NATO forces began bombing Libyan 
Government positions—including air defense systems and command and 
control centers; these bombing missions increased throughout the civil 
war.56 Meanwhile, calls for further support began to surface from Libyan 
fighters, who were the soldiers NATO was trying to aid.57 To help these 
fighters, NATO shifted its focus from one of pure military objectives to 
that of destroying the Libyan infrastructure and removing Gaddafi’s 
organization—making way for the establishment of the rebel regime.58 
Once Gaddafi’s regime was destroyed, the Security Council’s main focus 
became turning control of the nation over to the victorious rebels.59 
 
 
 53. For a more thorough analysis on the kinds of atrocities committed, see Karin Laub, Libyan 
Estimate: At Least 30,000 Died in the War, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/feedarticle/9835879. 
 54. After acknowledging the numerous condemnations against Libya from a variety of nations 
and alliances, the Security Council authorized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) to 
use force in two separate ways via Resolution 1973. These methods are discussed in the following text. 
 55. S.C. Res 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 56. Barry Neild & Xan Rice, Gaddafi’s Son Killed in NATO Air Strike, Say Libyan Officials, 
GUARDIAN (May 1, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/01/libya-muammar-gaddafi-
son-nato1. This military continuation, however, led to disagreements between NATO and both UN 
forces and Libyan rebel forces. Spencer Zifcak notes that, in particular, Russia began to have 
reservations about the targets NATO forces were attacking, specifically calling the attack that killed 
Gaddafi’s son a “disproportionate use of force.” Spencer Zifcak, The Future: The Responsibility to 
Protect After Libya and Syria, 13 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 59, 65 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 
6528th mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6528 (May 4, 2011)). 
 57. The rebel fighters complained that they lacked both military discipline and firepower, and, 
without more intensive NATO bombings, they would be unable to control the ground war. C.J. 
Chivers & David D. Kirkpatrick, Libyan Rebels Complain of Deadly Delays Under NATO’s 
Command, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/world/africa/05libya 
.html?_r=0. 
 58. Zifcak, supra note 56, at 66. 
 59. As the Chinese delegation noted, in order for the R2P to be considered a success: 
First, stability and order should be restored to the country as soon as possible . . . Secondly, 
the aspirations and choices of the Libyan people must be respected. Libya’s sovereignty, 
independence, unity and territorial integrity must be genuinely respected . . . Thirdly, an 
inclusive political process should be launched as soon as possible . . . enabling Libya to 
embark swiftly on the path of national reconciliation . . . Fourthly, in assisting Libya in its 
reconstruction, the United Nations and the Security Council should play a leading role in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.  
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In essence, the U.N., and specifically the R2P had debatably played 
their part.60 As Professor Spencer Zifcak noted, “success in Libya came 
without the imposition of ‘boots on the ground’ . . . . This success, and the 
strategies employed to achieve it, may similarly hold important lessons for 
any future Pillar 3 interventions.”61 
B. Non-Use of the R2P: The Events and Non-Action During the Syrian 
Civil War 
With the success of the R2P in the Côte d’Ivoire and—perhaps more 
impressively—Libya, why is the R2P not utilized during the Syrian civil 
war? To solve this query, an examination of the effects of the program on 
present conflicts and future possibilities is needed. The logical place to 
begin is with the civil war in Syria. 
After relatively standard protests62 occurred from late-January to mid-
March 2011, demonstrations began to grow both in size and number. The 
Syrian government began to respond with stronger and more severe 
showings of force.63 During this time, the actions taken by the Syrian 
government arguably met the standard of Mass Atrocity Crimes. 
 
 
Id. at 67 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6620th mtg. at 4–5, U.N Doc. S/PV.6620 (Sept. 16, 2011)) 
(omissions in original). 
 60. Despite objections that the military methods went beyond went beyond the scope that was 
needed for the situation, the military victory that was presented in Libya was enough to validate the 
R2P program. Ramesh Thakur, R2P, Libya and International Politics as the Struggle for Competing 
Normative Architectures, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN 
LIGHT OF THE LIBYAN INTERVENTION 12, 13 (2011), available at http://www.e-ir.info/wp-
content/uploads/R2P.pdf. 
 61. Zifcak, supra note 56, at 69. 
 62. Although shocking and disturbing, isolated actions such as self-immolation, random beatings, 
and random arrests are not actions upon which the international community can act under the R2P. See 
supra notes 32–36. 
 63. By mid-April, protestors were calling for the removal of the current Syrian regime, reflective 
of other protests around the region such as the aforementioned protest in Libya. Anthony Shadid, Amid 
Crackdown, Big Protest is Planned in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2011/04/21/world/middleeast/21syria.html. Around this time, the Syrian government began to 
use extreme force to quell and repress the protests. Based on reports from U.N. agencies, Under-
Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe reported to the Security Council that the Syrian government had 
reportedly used “artillery fire against unarmed civilians, door-to-door arrest campaigns, the shooting of 
medical personnel who attempt to aid the wounded, raids against hospitals, clinics and mosques and 
the purposeful destruction of medical supplies and arrests of medical personnel.” U.N. SCOR, 66th 
Sess., 6524th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6524 (Apr. 27, 2011). Further atrocities included the 
government cutting off electricity, water, and communications to demonstrating cities, as well as mass 
arrests and torture of protesters, and professionals such as lawyers, journalists, and human rights 
defenders. Id. at 3. 
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The Security Council met to discuss Syria at the end of April 2011, and 
Western nations sought to intervene.64 By contrast, Russia disagreed with 
the Western assessment of the situation.65 Though the Security Council, 
and later the Human Rights Council, condemned Syria, the violence 
escalated until more than 1,000 people had died and 8,000 more had been 
arbitrarily detained.66 When Security Council members discussed utilizing 
the R2P to intervene, both Russia and China raised objections citing how 
Resolution 1973 had been used too liberally in Libya, and stated their 
reservations for employing a document that could be expanded to such a 
degree, as had been the case in Libya.67 Meanwhile, the crisis continued. 
After five months of conflict, France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom created a resolution and introduced it to the Security Council.68 
Although nine members voted in favor of the bill and four non-P5 
members abstained, China and Russia both voted against the proposal, 
ultimately vetoing and killing the resolution.69 
 
 
 64. The United Kingdom proposed four measures: (1) the violence had to end immediately; 
(2) the Syrian regime had to immediately respond to the legitimate demands of its people calling for a 
genuine reform; (3) those responsible for the violence should be made accountable for their actions by 
the Syrian government; and (4) the international community should speak with one voice condemning 
the killings and abuses of human rights, essentially eliminating the multiple and contradictory points of 
view held by various nations about the situation in Syria. Id. at 5. 
 65. Russia stated that both the government and the opposition had committed violence, and that 
the dispute was an internal matter. Id. at 7. 
 66. Update Report: Syria, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (May 16, 2011), http://www.security 
councilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Update%20Report 
%2026%20May%202011%20Syria.pdf; see also Khalid Ali, Woman and Child Among Up to 26 
Bodies ‘Found in Mass Graves’ Outside City, INDEPENDENT (May 18, 2011), http://www.independent 
.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/woman-and-child-among-26-bodies-found-in-mass-graves-near-syrian-
city-2285524.html; The Current Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in the Context of 
Recent Events, H.R.C. Res. S-16/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-16/1 (May 4, 2011).  
 67. Henry Meyer, Brad Cook & Ilya Arkhipov, Russia Warns U.S., NATO Against Military Aid 
to Syria Protests After Libya, BLOOMBERG (June 2, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-
01/russia-warns-u-s-nato-against-military-aid-to-syria-protests-after-libya.html. Due to this deadlock 
in the Security Council, the President of the Security Council (which was India in August 2011) issued 
a presidential statement expressing “grave concern” about the crisis in Syria and condemned the 
atrocities that were occurring there. S.C. Pres. Statement 2011/16, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/16 
(Aug. 3, 2011); see also Jayshree Bajoria & Robert McMahon, The Dilemma of Humanitarian 
Intervention, COUNCIL FOR. REL. (June 12, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/ 
dilemma-humanitarian-intervention/p16524.   
 68. The resolution condemned “the continued grave and systematic human rights violations and 
the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities,” called for “an inclusive Syrian-led political 
process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism,” and 
included the threat of sanctions should Syria not resolve the conflict quickly and peacefully. Russia 
and China Veto Draft Security Council Resolution on Syria, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39935#.UJ3B517V0Wc. 
 69. Id.; see also Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft 
Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by 
Russian Federation, China, U.N. Press Release SC/10403 (Oct. 4, 2011). Russia gave four reasons: 
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Two subsequent events further weakened the Russian argument, but 
Russia has not changed its position.70 The first occurred in mid-November 
2011 and stemmed from Arab League intervention.71 The second event 
happened when the Human Rights Council issued a report dispatching a 
Commission of Inquiry72 at the end of November.73 Following several 
meetings of the Security Council, the Arab League drafted a resolution 
that was presented in January of 2012.74 Despite much international 
pressure and increasing isolation within the Security Council, Russia again 
effectively vetoed the resolution by stating that revision of the resolution 
was necessary before they would vote in favor of it.75 Morocco presented a 
 
 
(1) the resolution overshadowed Syria’s right to national sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) the 
resolution was founded on confrontation, rather than peaceful dialogue between the Syrian government 
and the rebels; (3) the violence in Syria was inflicted by both sides, and the Syrian government was 
confronted by terrorist attacks (essentially echoing earlier Syrian press releases); and (4) the 
intervention in Libya extended into areas that the R2P was not meant to reach. Russia feared this type 
of overextension would occur in Syria. U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th mtg. at 3-4, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.6627 (Oct. 4, 2011) (statement of Amb. Vitaly Churkin). The United States retorted that the 
proposed military intervention and Libyan response were not at issue, but rather Russia’s desire to sell 
arms to the Syrian regime trumped Russia’s desire to stand up for the Syrian people. Id. at 8 (statement 
of Amb. Susan Rice). 
 70. Zifcak, supra note 56, at 79. 
 71. The Arab League suspended Syria as a member of the League and imposed sanctions after 
giving the regime three days to comply with their wishes. These sanctions were imposed so as to force 
a cessation of violence, an immediate commencement of political reforms, a release of political 
prisoners, genuine dialogue with the Syrian opposition, and the inclusion of Arab League observers 
during these peace talks. Although Arab League observers were allowed into Syria by the end of 2011, 
the violence had not stopped, and the Syrian regime and not complied with further Arab League 
wishes. See Dominic Evans, Arab League Team Arrives in Syria as Violence Goes On, REUTERS, Dec. 
22, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/22/us-syria-arabs-idUSTRE7BI0H520 
111222; see also Syria Unrest: Arab League Monitors’ Advance Team Arrives, BBC (Dec. 22, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16296255; Alice Fordham, Arab League Team Goes to 
Syria, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2011, at A12.   
 72. The Commission of Inquiry was formed by the Human Rights Council. See H.R.C. Res. S-
17/1, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 17th Spec. Sess., Aug. 22–23, 2011, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/S-17/2 (Oct. 18, 2011); see generally Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/menaregion/pages/ 
syindex.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
 73. The devastating report concluded that the Syrian Government had been responsible for the 
commission of crimes against humanity and that the Syrian military and security forces had committed 
gross violations of human rights. See Zifcak, supra note 56, at 79–81 for a more thorough summary. 
 74. The Arab League’s plan called for a transfer government in Syria, a new regime that would 
hold parliamentary elections, which would be supervised by both an Arab and international presence. 
Failure to follow this plan would result in further international sanctions and further pressure. UN 
Draft Resolution on Syria, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-
31/world/35437994_1_syrian-government-syrian-authorities-peaceful-resolution. 
 75. Russia vetoed the bill for two reasons. First, they claimed that a removal of President al-
Assad constituted an incursion upon Syrian sovereignty. Second, they cited a slippery-slope argument, 
essentially stating that this was one step further than the Libyan intervention, and that such 
interventions would only intensify in the future. These notions will be examined and critiqued later. 
See Soviet Hangover Turned Headache: Syria and Russia, GUARDIAN, Feb. 1, 2012, at 30. 
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new, hastily written resolution to the Security Council, which sought to 
intervene to a lesser extent.76 On the eve of voting on the resolution, 
fighting erupted in Syria, and more than 210 people were killed.77 The 
following day, thirteen Security Council members voted in favor of the 
resolution. Russia and China vetoed it.78 At the time of this Note’s 
publication, Syria is still engaged in conflict. 
IV. CRITICISM OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND A RESPONSE 
A. Criticism of the R2P 
1. Infringing on a Nation’s Sovereignty 
Between the Security Council’s failure to act during the conflict in 
Syria, and the imposition of military intervention in Libya, the 
international community was left with a critical view of the R2P. One of 
the most common arguments against the R2P is the concept that 
imposition of military—or even diplomatic—sanctions on an independent 
nation would violate that nation’s sovereignty. 
A basic tenant of statehood is a nation’s sovereignty, meaning that a 
nation should be allowed to govern its own affairs, including the laws by 
which its citizens live.79 One key aspect of national sovereignty is the right 
 
 
 76. The transition of power, which was detailed in the Arab League’s original resolution, was 
removed, as was the provision encouraging the international community to impose sanctions on Syria 
if the regime continued in violence. It further specified that the resolution was not meant to be a 
coercive measure against Syrian autonomy, but instead called for a cease-fire and access for 
international humanitarian assistance, as well as political dialogue. U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
S/2012/77 (Feb. 4, 2012). 
 77. Ben Quinn, Syria: More Than 200 Dead After ‘Massacre’ in Homs, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/04/syria-report-homs-killings.   
 78. Following the failure of the resolution, Security Council members bitterly debated one 
another. The American Ambassador described the United States as “disgusted,” while the British 
Ambassador mused “[t]hose who blocked Council action today must ask themselves how many more 
deaths they are prepared to tolerate before they support even modest and measured action.” Zifcak, 
supra note 56, at 83, (quoting Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft 
Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed 
Peace Plan, U.N. Press Release SC/10536 (Feb. 4, 2012)). Russia countered by claiming that the 
resolution would undermine the possibility of a political settlement, while China called the resolution a 
prejudiced attempt to pressure Syrian authorities. Id. at 84. 
 79. For a thorough examination of national sovereignty and how it relates to the international 
community, see Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, National Sovereignty in an Interdependent World 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10249, 2004), available at http://www.nber 
.org/papers/w10249. 
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to stop foreign nations from interfering with the way a government 
manages its nation.80  
One of the classic critiques of the R2P is that it would be considered an 
infringement on national sovereignty for one nation to intervene in 
another’s affairs.81 This argument can be rebutted (or at least justifiably 
dismissed).82 However, for many nations, this is not just a worry about 
mild encroachment on national sovereignty but instead a greater concern 
of serious interference. 
A tangentially related complaint is often, but not exclusively, raised by 
Russia and China. Essentially, they complain that the “G3” (Britain, 
France, and the United States) are attempting to impose their power over 
non-Western nations by unilateral intervention.83 During the debates about 
intervening in Kosovo, Russia, and to a lesser extent China, voiced their 
concerns that the G3 (and particularly the United States) was attempting to 
force unwanted Western values on other nations.84 The “G2” nations 
(Russia and China) are not the only ones to voice this concern. India85 and 
Iran86 have also referenced this concern as a criticism of the R2P. The 
amount of weight this concern holds as a justification for voting against 
R2P measures is hard to quantify, especially taking counterarguments into 
consideration. 
 
 
 80. “‘Sovereignty.’ A government which exercises de facto administrative control over a country 
and is not subordinate to any other government in that country or a foreign sovereign state.” 
STROUD’S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY 2461 (5th ed. 1986). 
 81. Often nations will argue that a resolution will discard the importance of a country’s 
sovereignty in favor of unilateral action. U.N. SCOR, supra note 63, at 13. Other nations worry that 
any unilateral action or imposition of will violates a state’s sovereignty and should not be allowed. See 
Rick Moran, Libya and the Soros Doctrine, FRONTPAGE MAG. (Mar. 28, 2011), http://frontpage 
mag.com/2011/rick-moran/libya-and-the-soros-doctrine/. 
 82. See Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 17, at 7–8. 
 83. See Yuki Yoshida, From Kosovo to Libya: Theoretical Assessment of Humanitarian 
Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, E-INT’L REL. (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.e-
ir.info/2013/01/16/from-kosovo-to-libya-theoretical-assessment-of-humanitarian-intervention-and-the-
responsibility-to-protect/. 
 84. See generally Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect: Revisiting 
Humanitarian Intervention, 81(6) FOREIGN. AFF. 99 (2002), available at http://www.foreignaffairs 
.com/articles/58437/gareth-evans-and-mohamed-sahnoun/the-responsibility-to-protect; see also Eiki 
Berg & Martin Mölder, Janus-Faced Human Security Discourse: EU and Russia Talking Past Each 
Other in Kosovo and the Caucasus?, at 10 (Centre for EU-Russia Studies EU-Russia Papers No. 4, 
2012), available at http://ceurus.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/EU-Russia-Papers-4.pdf. 
 85. Mahmood Mamdani, Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish? 4 J. INTERVENTION & 
STATEBUILDING 53 (2010), available at http://gpia.info/files/u1449/Mamdani-Responsibility_to_ 
Protect_or_Right_to_Punish.pdf. It should be noted that this complaint seems to stem mainly from the 
ICC’s jurisdictional reach in prosecuting individual leaders, and less from the intervention of entire 
nations in one another’s sovereignty. Id. 
 86. Eaton, supra note 8, at 789. 
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2. Scope and Breadth of the Responsibility to Protect 
A further worry, which has existed since the R2P’s conception, 
involves the scope of intervention. Currently, and with the general 
consensus of U.N. member states, a nation can only become involved 
under the R2P if one of the four aforementioned Mass Atrocity Crimes 
take place. However, some nations have called for the expansion of the 
R2P to include situations such as natural disasters that result in large loss 
of life because of government neglect.87 Proponents of this expansion 
assert that the R2P is not broad enough to protect against this loss of life. 
There are other critiques of the R2P, even when there are clear 
instances of one of the four Mass Atrocity Crimes. As previously noted, 
no clear indications exist to determine when military force may be used, 
despite the given guidelines.88 Although the international community 
decided during the ICISS not to delineate specific instances when military 
force should be used, nations continue to complain about the lack of 
guidelines.89 
 
 
 87. A good example of this proposal occurred when a cyclone struck Burma and Myanmar in 
2008. Typically, humanitarian groups provide aid for citizens who are devastated by natural disasters. 
In this instance, however, the governments of Burma and Myanmar denied access to public aid. Since 
these nations caused further loss of life due to the denial of public aid, there was a call for other 
nations to interfere. However, as these actions did not fall under Mass Atrocity Crimes, no intervention 
occurred. For more information, see ASIA-PACIFIC CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
CYCLONE NARGIS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, MYANMAR/BURMA BRIEFING NO. 2 (May 
16, 2008), available at  http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?module=uploads&func= 
download&fileId=539; see also Annalina Kazickas, Humanitarian Intervention, The Responsibility to 
Protect, and the Need to Better Protect Our Citizens (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
http://www.jmu.edu/mwa/docs/2011/kazickas.pdf). 
 88. See the six criteria mentioned supra note 10 and accompanying text. These critera offer 
situations that must be met in order to intervene militarily, but these criteria are not specific enough for 
some nations. For example, any military intervention must have “legitimate authority.” This language 
is painfully vague to some critics. Can legitimate authority stem from rebels initiating a coup d’état? 
What happens when the standing government loses control over part of the nation, as is the case in 
Syria? For a more detailed examination, see Sean Lynch, Note, An Invitation to Meddle: The 
International Community’s Intervention in Libya and the Doctrine of Intervention by Invitation, 2 
CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 173 (2012). See also Christopher J. Le Mon, Legality of a Request by 
the Interim Iraqi Government for the Continued Presence of United States Military Forces, AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. (June 2004), http://www.asil.org/insigh135.cfm. 
 89. STANLEY FOUNDATION, ACTUALIZING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 43RD 
CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE NEXT DECADE (2008), available at http://www.stanley 
foundation.org/publications/report/UNND808.pdf; see also ASIA PACIFIC CENTRE FOR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, FUNDING PROPOSAL: STRENGTHENING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (2012), available at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/makediff/humanitarian/ 
policy-partnerships/Documents/r2p-asia-pacific-proposal-core-funding.pdf; see R2P: Time to Rework 
the Rules, Reforge Consensus, CONNECTED (Mar. 26, 2013), http://anodeinthenetwork.wordpress.com/ 
2013/03/26/the-responsibility-to-protect-syria-libya-brics-prevention/. 
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3. Differing Interests in the Security Council 
An interesting criticism of the R2P involves the political interests of 
the P5 members, and the sabotage of many Security Council resolutions as 
a result. From a skeptical perspective, a perfect example is that Russia 
abstained from voting on a resolution for military intervention in Libya to 
form a no-fly zone,90 but later vetoed a resolution calling for a lesser 
sanction on Syria.91 Russia vetoes these resolutions on what it calls 
principle.92 However, Russia has significant political, economic, and 
strategic investment in Syria.93 An additional illustration is Russia’s 
vetoing any involvement in Chechnya.94 This power can be used 
conversely, as well. Russia used the notion of “humanitarian intervention” 
during their 2008 campaign inside Georgia.95 Critics of the R2P state that 
the R2P will never be implemented in all appropriate situations due to the 
differing interests of the P5 members.  
 
 
 90. UN Vote Approves Libya No-Fly Zone; China, Russia Abstain, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 17, 
2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/un-vote-approves-libya-no-fly-zone-china-russia-abstain-276107. 
 91. Joe Lauria, Russia, China Veto Syria Resolution at U.N., WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444097904577536793560681930.html. 
 92. Ellen Barry, As Nations Line Up Against Syrian Government, Russia Sides Firmly with 
Assad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/europe/russia-sides-
firmly-with-assad-government-in-syria.html?_r=0. Zifcak analyzed this further. According to his 
examination,  
Syria is a major purchaser of exports of Russian arms and defence equipment. The Syrian 
market is worth six per cent of the overall arms export industry. . . . Syria hosts a strategically 
positioned Russian naval base at Tartus on the west coast, its only one outside the former 
Soviet Union. . . . [Russia] has major economic investments in Syria, principally in the 
business of natural gas extraction. . . . It is unsurprising given these important connections 
that the Russians do not wish to see them disturbed by the replacement of the al-Assad 
regime. Its veto at the Security Council provides it with political power it needs to forestall 
any such possibility. 
Zifcak, supra note 56, at 91. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Simply put, Russia sold Chechens arms, mirroring the situation in Syria. See Is the Main 
Source of Chechen Rebel Weapons Georgia, or the Russian Army?, JAMESTOWN FOUND. (Oct. 29, 
2010), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37102&cHash= 
25a179275d. 
 95. The Russian government argued that Georgia’s initial actions against the local population in 
the Republic of South Ossetia constituted genocide. Of particular relevance is that Russia also has a 
“responsibility to protect” provision in their own constitution. Critics of Russia merely need to cite the 
R2P in their argument to demonstrate how Russia can use their P5 membership as a way to manipulate 
politics on a global scale. See Gareth Evans, Opinion, Russia and the “Responsibility to Protect”, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-evans31-2008aug31 
,0,3632207.story. 
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B. Response to Criticism 
1. Reply to Claims of State Sovereignty Violations 
Counterarguments towards state sovereignty violations led to a shift in 
thinking occurred within the ICISS. Instead of assuming a nation is 
entitled to state sovereignty and will protect its population, sovereignty is 
predicated upon a state protecting its own people.96 Although the revised 
ICISS was not adopted, its ideology has become more accepted in 
international law.97 
To combat the complaint that the Security Council is commanding 
undue influence on a nation’s sovereignty, proponents of the R2P state 
that in nearly every instance of influence, outside countries are only there 
to assist, not interfere, with the nation.98 Intervention will not occur unless 
a violating nation refuses to change its actions.99 Although there are 
several rebuttals to this claim,100 U.N. officials, and some scholars, voice 
 
 
 96. As one author noted, 
The ICISS report [was] innovative. It [made] a compelling case for shifting the focus of the 
notion of humanitarian intervention from the rights of the interveners to the rights of at-risk 
populations and the ‘duty’ of states to protect them. The report maintain[ed] that state 
authorities are ultimately responsible for protecting their citizens from serious harm and that 
when they are unable or unwilling to do so, the principle of nonintervention is trumped by the 
international responsibility to protect.  
Jeremy I. Levitt, The Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver Without a Dam?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 153, 
175 (2003) (reviewing INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001)). See generally Payandeh, supra note 15, at 485–87. See also 
David Aronofsky, The International Legal Responsibility to Protect Against Genocide, War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity: Why National Sovereignty Does Not Preclude Its Exercise, 13 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 317, 318 (2007); Christopher C. Joyner, “The Responsibility to Protect”: 
Humanitarian Concern and the Lawfulness of Armed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 693, 718–19 
(2007). 
 97. During the implementation of the R2P in the 2009 session of the General Assembly, the 
Secretary-General noted that not only had the concept of a nation’s responsibility to protect received 
the consensus of world leaders, but it was also spearheaded by Africa. This observation is crucial; it 
emphasizes that a “responsibility to protect” is not merely a Western concept. U.N. Secretary-General, 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 
12, 2009). 
 98. ICISS Report, supra note 4. See also Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Annual Report 
to the General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM7136 (Sept. 20, 1999). But see Edward Luttwak, 
Kofi’s Rule: Humanitarian Intervention and Neocolonialism, 58 NAT’L INT. 57, 60 (1999), for a 
rebuttal to Annan’s remarks. 
 99. Bannon notes that there is a hierarchy of actions under the scope of the R2P that countries 
will take against an offending nation. For instance, the UN will act before individual nations enter the 
situation, and diplomatic actions will always occur before militaristic intervention. Bannon seems to 
suggest that this gradual hierarchy is meant in part to keep nations from infringing on one another’s 
sovereignty. See Bannon, supra note 15, at 1164. 
 100. See generally Levitt, supra note 96. 
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optimism that nations are not unduly interfering with sovereignty, but 
instead are offering aid to neighbors in need of help. 
2. Reply to Those Calling for the Expansion of the R2P 
There is currently no widespread effort to expand the R2P. Due to this 
lack of enlargement, little analysis is needed in this Note. During the 
codification of the R2P in 2009, several member states explicitly 
reaffirmed that they were adhering to the 2005 R2P parameters.101 More 
states went even further, stating that a broader application of the R2P 
would diminish its effectiveness as a program.102 Judging between 
scholarly analysis and general international resistance, it is unlikely that 
the R2P will be expanded. 
V. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT GOING FORWARD 
A. The Responsibility While Protecting (“RWP”) 
The RWP was born out of a Brazilian concept paper,103 and introduced 
to the U.N. General Assembly in late 2011. While the R2P reacts to 
atrocities carried out by governments, the purpose of the RWP is to 
promote proactive assistance to avoid potential atrocities.104 These 
preemptive measures include preventative diplomacy, as a means to 
reduce the risk of human atrocities.105 Other changes to the R2P would 
 
 
 101. See generally U.N. Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 17. 
 102. Elodie Aba and Michael Hammer’s briefing outlines several reasons why broadening the 
scope of the R2P would constitute a deathblow to the program. Among their reasons are that fewer 
states would commit to the Program, that nations would fight more bitterly before it would be 
implemented in an international situation, and many more draft resolutions would be vetoed if the 
R2P’s scope could be expanded. See Elodie Aba & Michael Hammer, Yes We Can? Options and 
Barriers to Broadening the Scope of the Responsibility to Protect to Include Cases of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights Abuse (One World Trust Briefing Paper No. 116, 2009), available at  
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Yes_we_can_-_R2P_and_ESC_Rights[1].pdf. 
 103. Permanent Rep. of Brazil to the U.N., Letter dated Nov. 9, 2011 from the Permanent Rep. of 
Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/551 (Nov. 11, 2011). 
See also Amelia Mae Wolf, Features: Responsibility While Protecting—The Impact of a New Initiative 
on RtoP, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Sept. 14, 2012), http://icrtop 
blog.org/feature/. 
 104. FRANCIS M. DENG, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE PREVENTION OF 
GENOCIDE, THE RESPONSIBILITY WHILE PROTECTING (RWP) TALKING POINTS FOR REMARKS (2012), 
available at http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/FD%2021%20February%20remarks% 
20-%20English.pdf. See also Wolf, supra note 103. 
 105. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Statement by H.E. Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota 
Minister of External Relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil; Informal Discussion at the United 
Nations on the ‘Responsibility While Protecting,’ PERMANENT MISSION OF BRAZIL TO THE UNITED 
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enhance the Security Council’s procedures of monitoring global situations 
to better assess any potential problems, and to arrive at the correct 
proportional solution.106  
Ultimately, however, the RWP might actually hinder the R2P in the 
event that the two documents be merged. One immediate criticism is that 
the RWP leads to a violation of national sovereignty before any actual 
Mass Atrocity Crime has occurred.107 Further criticism stems from the fear 
that while nations lead drawn-out negotiations, potential violators will be 
incentivized to inflict greater harm in the intermediary.108 This fear, 
coupled with a lack of Western enthusiasm,109 makes it likely that the 
RWP will ultimately remain separate from the R2P. 
B. A Potential Change and the R2P’s Failure 
Looking at the benefits and drawbacks of the R2P, one conceptual 
suggestion would be a small change to R2P procedure. Essentially, if a P5 
member vetoes a draft resolution, the Security Council must still issue a 
reprimand to the nation in question.110 Should any specified criteria be 
met, the action would be officially presented to the General Assembly, 
although no additional measures could be taken.111 
 
 
NATIONS (Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/12d-agp-RESPONSIBILITY-
WHILE-PROTECTING.html. 
 106. Id. See also Chris Kreutzner, Responsibility While Protecting: Help or Hindrance to R2P, 
INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N—UNIV. OF OTTAWA (Nov. 16, 2012), http://ilsauottawa.wordpress.com/ 
2012/11/16responsibility-while-protecting-help-or-hindrance-to-r2p/. 
 107. Predictably, China and Russia raised this objection during one of the first discussions of the 
RWP. See Matias Spektor, Humanitarian Interventionism Brazilian Style?, AM. Q. (2012),  
http://www.americasquarterly.org/humanitarian-interventionism-brazilian-style. 
 108. Thomas Wright, Brazil Hosts Workshop on ‘Responsibility While Protecting’, FOR. POL’Y 
(Aug. 29, 2012), http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/29/brazil_backs_responsibility_while_ 
protecting. 
 109. Kreutzner, supra note 106. 
 110. This reprimand would only be available if it meets certain criteria. First, at least thirteen of 
the fifteen Security Council members must vote in favor of a draft resolution under the scope of the 
R2P. In addition, four of the five P5 members must have voted affirmatively to pass the resolution, 
meaning only one veto could have occurred. 
 111. The reasoning behind this course of action is simple. Currently, P5 members often veto draft 
resolutions because they are allies with the nation under scrutiny. With this reporting system 
established, a P5 nation can successfully protect its international interest while the international 
community can still take some semblance of a measure against the nation committing atrocities, even 
if it is only a reprimand. One of the interesting aspects of this idea would be the relationship that 
Russia and China currently share. As previously shown, when examining issues such as national 
sovereignty and military force, Russia and China often share similar sentiments and theories. Yet when 
draft resolutions are vetoed, China will either vote for its passage or abstain from voting entirely. It is 
typically Russia that vetoes the draft resolution. Should this system be implemented, it would create 
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Unfortunately, neither the G3 nor G2 nations would accept this change 
to the R2P because it would undermine the entire concept of the Security 
Council112 The only way to change a P5’s veto power is to have P5 
members unanimously approve the alteration, an event that is highly 
unlikely.113 
What is more practical, however, would be an informal agreement 
where the P5 vows not to veto a R2P measure that would otherwise pass 
by a majority. Aside from completely eliminating the R2P, this would be 
the best way to effectively implement the program in more general 
conflicts.114 Nonetheless, an informal agreement seems relatively unlikely. 
Due to political and economic considerations, it is doubtful that P5 nations 
will forego global alliances in order to make the R2P a more effective 
doctrine.115 
It is also unlikely that the U.N. will reject or scrap the R2P. Even 
opponents of the R2P seem to recognize that the Program is in no danger 
 
 
interesting international repercussions. Either Russia and China would band together more closely or 
tension between the two nations would quickly become imminent 
 112. The G2 would likely not implement this idea, if for no other reason than it would change the 
status quo and alliance that is currently found in the Security Council. The G3 would likely never 
accept it for similar reasons. Finally, none of the P5 members would individually accept it—to do so 
would be to give up the veto power allotted to them from the creation of the Security Council. One 
such idea was debated in 2009 and ultimately quashed. See GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT, IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THE 2009 GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE: 
AN ASSESSMENT 6 (2009), available at http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/GCR2P_General_Assembly_ 
Debate_Assessment.pdf 
 113. There is no rational reason for the P5 to amend the U.N.’s Charter to decrease their power 
and prestige by effectively putting them on equal footing with non-permanent SC members. 
Furthermore, there has been constant fighting over how the amended resolution would even look, 
before being able to present it to the Security Council See Sahar Okhovat, The United Nations Security 
Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform (CPACS Working Paper No. 15/1, 2011), available at 
http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/working_papers/UNSC_paper.pdf. 
 114. ARIELA BLÄTTER, CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, THE RESPONSIBILITY NOT TO VETO: A 
WAY FORWARD (2010), available at http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/RN2V_White_ 
Paper_CGS.pdf. 
 115. Loosely responding to the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, Daniel Levine 
notes that “part of the problem [with the R2P] may be conceptual—R2P is a quasi-judicial concept and 
the UNSC is a political entity, so the fit will never be perfect.” See Daniel H. Levine, Some Concerns 
About “The Responsibility Not to Veto,” UNIV. OF MD. CENT. FOR INT’L & SECURITY STUD. (Apr. 5, 
2011), http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/some_concerns_about_the_responsibility_not_to_veto 
.pdf. Such a notion has been raised before. At the same time the R2P was proposed, the overall 
Security Council was examined and two amendments proposing a change to the structure of the 
Security Council were authored. Although both proposals sought to expand the size of the Security 
Council, neither proposal sought to change the veto power of the P5. The panel went so far as to state 
that they saw “no practical way of changing of changing the existing members’ veto powers.” See 
Yukio Satoh, Security Council Reform: The P5’s Responsibility to Act, WORLD SECURITY NETWORK 
FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2007), http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Japan/Satoh-Yukio/Security-Council-
Reform-The-P5s-Responsibility-to-Act. 
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of being rejected by the international community.116 It seems—at least for 
the time being—that the R2P, for better or worse, will not be amended. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
After numerous mass atrocities were committed during the 1990s, the 
U.N. sought to create a program to allow nations to hold one another 
responsible for the humane treatment of their citizens, and to stop Mass 
Atrocity Crimes if necessary. After years of discussion, the R2P was 
created. This document, which was comprised of three pillars, emphasized 
a nation’s duty to its people, and allowed other countries to interfere with 
conduct considered to be mass atrocities. 
The international community did not have to wait long to put the R2P 
doctrine to use, ultimately intervening in the Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. But 
because of political considerations, all R2P proposals regarding the Syrian 
conflict were vetoed by Russia and China. Thus, some glaring issues with 
the R2P became readily apparent. 
Since its inception, the idea of the R2P has come under heavy 
opposition for various reasons. Most common among these was the fear 
that the R2P would violate a nation’s sovereignty, and vagueness about 
when the R2P could actually be utilized. However, the most damaging 
criticism stems from the Security Council’s political nature. Due to global 
alliances, a member of the P5 often vetoes an R2P resolution for political 
or economic reasons, thus making the R2P ineffective. 
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any simple method of fixing 
the R2P. Although amendments and theoretical changes have been 
proposed, it is highly unlikely that the R2P will be amended, even in light 
of its obvious deficiencies. It appears that the R2P—the groundbreaking, 
yet flawed system that was established in 2005—will not be utilized to its 
full potential. 
Michael Small∗ 
 
 
 116. Steven Groves, for example, adamantly opposes the United State’s obligation to the R2P, 
making the classic arguments of national sovereignty and independence. Yet he seems to realize that 
even a country such as the United States, which thoroughly embraces these ideologies, seems unlikely 
to reject the R2P outright. Instead, he ends his article by stating that “[t]he United States should . . . 
continue to treat the responsibility to protect doctrine with grave skepticism.” Steven Groves, The U.S. 
Should Reject the U.N. “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 1, 2008), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/the-us-should-reject-the-un-responsibility-to-protect 
-doctrine. 
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